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THE INTRASTATE EXEMPTION: CURRENT LAW, LOCAL PRACTICE
AND THE WHEAT REPORT
In September, 1969, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
announced new proposed rules governing the public resale, without regis-
tration, of limited quantities of certain investment securities which were
originally acquired in a private placement or held by a control person.'
In general, these rules provide that a relatively insubstantial amount2 of a
"qualified" issuer's "restricted securities," i.e., those acquired in a private
offering from a reporting company,3 may be sold in ordinary trading
transactions, after having been held by the offeror for a period of at least
one year.' The proposed rules also apply to similar dispositions made on
behalf of a person controlling the issuer.5 Perhaps the most significant and
innovative change in securities regulation since the enactment in 1933 of
the Securities Act itself, these rules represent the first move on the part of
the Commission to implement some of the major policy recommendations
contained in the "'7heat Report."' They also indicate the extent to
which the SEC has accepted some of the principles underlying those recom-
mendations.
This being so, it would appear worthwhile to consider the possible ef-
fects which those policy changes may portend in a closely-related area of
securities law-that pertaining to intrastate offerings. Such is the purpose
of this article. After reviewing the current state of the law on this sub-
ject and after noting local practices which have been adopted to comply
therewith, an attempt will be made to assess the potential impact of the
WFheat Report proposals on the use of the intrastate exemption.
I. RULES REGULATING THE USE OF 3(a)(11)
Section 3(a) (11) of the Securities Act of 1933 specifically exempts
from the registration and prospectus requirements of section 5:
Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to per-
sons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such
1 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept 15, 1969).
2 For an explanation of the meaning of this phrase, see text and sources accompanying
note 136, in!ra.
3 For an explanation of the meaning of these terms, see text and sources accompanying
notes 126-29, infra.
4SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept 15, 1969).
5Id. It should be noted that, since the proposed rules also apply to persons controlling,
or controlled by, the issuer, SEC Rule 154, 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1970) will no longer be
necessary; consequently, it will be rescinded. See also, text and sources accompanying notes
125, 137-8, infra.
SEC STAFF, DiscLostnRE TO INVEsTORS--A REAPPRAiSAL OF FEDERAL AmDNISTRA-
wE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS--THE WHEAT REPORT 18-27, 149-247
(CCH ed., 1969). [Since this report was prepared under the direction of Commissioner
F. M. Wheat, it is known and will hereinafter be cited as the Wheat Report.]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
security is a person resident and doing business within, or, if a corporation,
incorporated by and doing business within, such State or Territory. 7
The purpose of this exemption was not so much to immunize federal se-
curities law from any constitutional infirmity thought to exist with re-
spect to wholly intrastate offerings; rather its aim was to preserve state
control over the raising of capital by business concerns whose activities
were largely confined to a single state." It is this policy which has so
markedly affected the development of 3(a) (11). In the words of the
Commission, "[t]he legislative history ...dearly shows that this exemp-
tion was designed to apply only to local financing that may practicably
be consummated in its entirety within the State or Territory in which the
issuer is both incorporated and doing business." Hence most of the
rules concerning intrastate offerings have focused on keeping a given dis-
tribution within the territorial boundaries of a single state. It is to these
rules that the following discussion is directed.
A. The "Issue" Concept: The Requirement of Ultimate Distribution to
Resident Investors
Many of the important restrictions on the availability and use of
3 (a) (11) stem from ideas associated with the statutory term "issue." As
interpreted, this term has come to mean that the "entire issue" of similar
classes of investment securities must be offered and sold exclusively to
residents who have purchased for investment and not with the intention
of reselling outside the state in question.'0 From this statement of the
rule, it should be evident that the issue concept in 3(a) (11) cannot be
avoided or evaded merely by floating "a part of the issue," i.e., substantially
the same securities, in different states."1 Thus where an issuer makes
7 Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(a)(11)(1963) [hereinafter cited
as "Securities Act" and occasionally referred to as the "Act" or the "'33 Act".]
8 See text and sources accompanying notes 156-64, infra.
9SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 17 C.F.R. § 231.4434 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961)]. This release which was ". . . pub-
lished to provide in convenient and up-to-date form a restatement of the principles underlying
Section 3(a)(11) as so expressed over the years . . ." is probably the most comprehensive and
authoritative source in this area of federal securities law. See also, Op. Gen. Counsel, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 1459 (May 29, 1937), 17 C.F.R. § 231.1459 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Sec. Act Release 1459 (1937)] and SEC Securities Act Release 4386 (July 12, 1961) [herein-
after cited as Sec. Act Release 4386 (1961)] both of which express the identical thought in
practically the same language. Since most of the ideas outlined in Sec. Act Release 4434
(1961) were originally articulated in the latter two releases, reference to all three will be
frequent.
10 Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961); Sec. Act Release 4386 (1961); Sec. Act Release 1459
(1937). Generally, see authorities cited notes 11-33, infra; McCauley, Instrastate Securities
Transactions under the Federal Securities Act, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 937 (1959); Sosin, The
Intrastate Exemption: Public Offerings and the Issue Concept, 16 W. RES, L. REv. 110 (1964).
11 Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961); Jackson Tool & Die, Inc. v. Smith, 339 F.2d 88, 90
(5th Cir. 1964), reviewed after trial, 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969); Peoples Securities Co.,
39 S.E.C. 641, 650-52 (1960), aff'd sub nom. without copsideration of this point, Peoples
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nearly contemporaneous offerings in several states of two or more "classes"
of securities-or "issues"--the terms of which are practically identical,
such securities might be viewed as an "integrated" part of a "single plan
of financing"; if so, the offerings would be treated as a single inter-
state offering of the same "issue."'" Should this occur, the "intrastate"
aspect of the offering, having been made without a registration statement
in effect, would contravene the provisions of section 5. And this result
would obtain even though the alleged offerings in other states were reg-
istered or were purportedly made pursuant to different exemptions.3 It
should further be evident, and it has been so held on a number of oc-
casions, that the requirement of offer and sale "only to persons resident"
is by no means limited to initial transfers between the issuer and those in
the distributive chain; 14 in fact, the residency of principal underwriters and
selling dealers is irrelevant. 15 Likewise, the exemption is not necessarily
available simply because dealers confine their initial sales to persons
resident within the state. For, should the latter prove to be mere conduits
for non-resident purchasers, an interstate distribution would have taken
place.' 6 What is required by the "issue" concept then is that "at the
time of completion of ultimate distribution, [all such securities offered
and sold] shall be found only in the hands of investors resident within
the state.' 17
Hence any "casual" resale to a non-resident by an ordinary, non-
Securities Co. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1961); Texas Glass Mfg. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630,
634-35 (1958); Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1942); 1 L. Loss, SE-
SURITIES REGULATIoN 593, 577-78 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as 1 Loss]. Cf., Unity
Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 625-26 (1938). See also, SEC v. Hillsborough Investment Corp.,
176 F. Supp. 789 (D.N.H. 1959), preliminary injunction, 173 F. Supp. 86 (1958), aff'd, 276
F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960); SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange, 186 F. Supp.
830, 870-72 (S.D. Cal. 1960), affd, 285 F.2d 162, 172 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied 366 U.S.
919 (1961). Cf., SEC v. Dunfee, CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 91,970 (W.D. Mo. 1966-67).
'
2 Authorities cited note 11, supra. See, SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES
M=ARKETs, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, 572, n.222 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as 1963 Special Study.]
13Authorities cited note 11, supra, FTC Securities Act ReleaseNo. 97, part 10 (Dec. 28,
1933) 17 C.F.R. § 231.97(j)(1970); 1 Loss at 593.
14Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961); Se'. Act Release 4386 (1961); Sec. Act Release 1459
(1937); FTC Securities Act Release No. 201 (July 20, 1934), C.F.R. § 231.201 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as Sec. Act Release 201 (1934)]. Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C.
147, 158-62 (1935). See, Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 274-5 (10th
Cir. 1957). See also, cases cited notes 21 & 23, infra.
15 Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961).
10 Obviously, the use of resident nominees, agents, and the like to circumvent the require-
ment would be illegal, see, e.g., FTC Securities Act Release No. 97, part 9 (Dec. 28, 1933),
17 C.F.R. § 231.97(i)(1970); Armstrong, Jones & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease 8420 (Oct. 3, 1968), aff'd sub nom., Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 361
(6th Cir. 1970); Belhumeur v. Dawson, 229 F. Supp. 78, 85 (D. Mont. 1964); SEC v. Hills-
borough Investment Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86, 87-90 (D.N.H. 1958), permanent injunction,
176 F. Supp. 789 (1959), aff'd, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960); 1 Loss at 596, n.133, & 604.
See also, authorities cited notes 21 & 23, infra.
17 Sec. Act Release 201 (1934); Sec. Act Release 1459 (1937). [Emphasis in original
in the latter release.]
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professional, resident investor, soon after he first acquired the securities,
could result in the Commission's determination that he had purchased with
a view to, or had sold for the issuer in connection with, the distribution,
or that he had indirectly participated in the underwriting of the issueY
Accordingly, the resident seller would be deemed a statutory "under-
writer" under section 2 (11), for whom no exemption would be available. 9
If, on the other hand, the Commission decided that the securities so ac-
quired were "held for investment" only and not for the purpose of en-
gaging in the distribution, then any such casual resale would not be im-
proper or violative of the Act."0 Far more important, however, from the
point of view of those actually participating in the underwriting are the
disastrous consequences that his action could have on their undertaking.
For an adverse determination would not only put him in violation of the
Act; it would also destroy the exemption for the entire issue.21 As to this,
the SEC has remained adamant: [ilf any part of the issue is offered or
sold to a non-resident, the exemption is unavailable not only for the se-
lsSecurities Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(l1)(1963), provides in part: "The term
'underwriter' means any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or
sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or
has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or ...in the direct or indirect
underwriting of any such undertaking. .. ."
19 Id.; Securities Act § 4(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(1)(Supp. 1970); Sec. Act Release 4434
(1961); Sec. Act Release 4386 (1961); Sec. Act Release 1459 (1937); SEC v. Van Horn,
371 F.2d 181, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1966). See, text and sources accompanying notes 16, 23-24,
& 27-33. Cf., Wheat Report at 160-72,203-05.
20 Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961); Sec. Act Release 1459 (1937).
2 1 Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961); Sec. Act Release 4386 (1961); Sec. Act Release 1459
(1937); Armstrong, Jones & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8420 (Oct 3, 1968),
aff'd sub nom., Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1970); Jackson
Tool & Die, Inc. v. Smith, 339 F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1964), reviewed after trial on a different
point, 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969); SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1966);
Capital Funds, Inc v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582, 584-87 (8th Cir. 1965); Belhumeur v. Dawson, 229
F. Supp. 78, 85 (D. Mont. 1964); SEC v. Hillsborough Investment Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86, 87-90
(D.N.H. 1958), permanent injunction, 176 F. Supp. 789 (1959), aff'd, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir.
1960); Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 274-75 (10th Cir. 1957); As-
sociated Investors Securities, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 160, 163 (1962); Universal Service Corp., 37
S.E.C. 559, 563-64 (1957); Professional Investors, Inc., 37 S.E.C. 173, 175 (1956); Petersen
Engine Co., 2 S.E.C. 893, 903 (1937); cases cited note 23, infra. It should be noted here that:.
The intrastate exemption is not dependent upon non-use of the mails or instru-
ments of interstate commerce in the distribution. Securities [issued under 3(a)(11)]
.may be offered and sold without registration through the mails or by use of any
instruments ... in interstate commerce.... It should be emphasized, however, that
the civil liability and antifraud provisions of Sections 12(2) and 17 of the Act never-
theless apply and may give rise to civil liabilities and to other sanctions. . . . Sec.
Act Release 4434 (1961).
On the other hand, a "face-to-face" sale to a non-resident would still destroy the exemption,
even though there was no use of the mails or interstate commerce, and even though that par-
ticular sale would not be violative of § 5. "That is to say, a sale (whether to a resident or a
non-resident) cannot itself violate § 5 if no use is made of the jurisdictional means in any
step of the transaction; but even a face-to-face sale to a non-resident makes illegal those sales
(whether to residents or non-residents) which do involve some use of the mails or interstate
facilities." 1 Loss at 593. This would be so because the offering would then have become an
interstate distribution. See, H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1934).
[Vol. 31
COMMENTS
curities so sold, but for all securities forming a part of the issue, including
those sold to residents. 22
This particular view of the law raises some difficult questions for
counsel and especially for those involved in the chain of distribution.
Under the present rule as formulated, even a solitary, inadvertent and
otherwise innocuous offer to a non-resident could conceivably invalidate
the exemption and, with it, the entire underwriting effort 23 This would
be so, even though no actual sales to non-residents were made. Con-
cededly this is improbable. Most counsel believe that cases such as these
are never prosecuted. Usually, they say, a hint of fraud must be present
merely to warrant the expense of investigation. Nevertheless, the author-
ities have often stated that a single improper sale is sufficient to destroy
the exemption. -4 Moreover, a "pattern" of several such sales could supply
that hint of fraud. And any substantial "trading" activity emerging soon
after the initial offering could certainly make the entire issue suspect.
2 5
Even a public advertisement which failed to appropriately limit its solici-
tation to resident investors could cast doubt upon the "local" character of
the offering.20 For these reasons, rigorous policing of the entire distribu-
tive process is mandatory if an issuer is to comfortably rely on 3 (a) (11).
A related and equally troublesome problem under the current rule
is the test which is employed to determine the effect of an out-of-state
sale upon the validity of the exemption. Perhaps the best characteriza-
tion of this standard is the one made by the Commission itself:
The relevance of any such resales consists only of the evidentiary light
22 Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961); Sec. Act Release 4386 (1961). See, Sec. Act Release
1459 (1937).
23 Hillsborough Investment Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86, 87-90 (D.N.H. 1958), permanent
injunction, 176 F. Supp. 789 (1959), aff'd, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960); Edsco MWg. Co.,
40 S.E.C. 865, 869 (1961); 1963 Special Study at 571, n.220 and accompanying text, 1 Loss
at 592. See, S. REP. No. 1036 at 13, H.R. REP. No. 1542 at 22, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954);
Whitehall Corp., 38 S.E.C. 259, 268-70 (1958). Cf., SEC v. Dunfee, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
5 91,970 (W.D. Mo. 1966-67); SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal.
1957).
24 See authorities cited note 23, supra.
25 In Sec. Act Release 4386 (1961), the Commission described the situation referred to
in the text as follows:
... [T1 he quick commencement of trading and prompt resale of portions of the issue
to non-residents raises a serious question whether all of the issue has, in fact, come to
rest in the hands of investors resident in the state of initial offering. Where these
practices are followed, it is likely that portions of the issue will be offered or sold to
non-residents through residents and dealers purchasing for resale and thus constitute
elements of the distribution to investors. [Emphasis added).
Thus any substantial "trading" activities which developed soon after the initial offering could
result in an SEC investigation to determine whether improper resales had in fact been made.
Ct., Armstrong, Jones & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8420 (Oct. 3, 1968),
aff'd sub nom., Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1970); Sec. Art
Release 4434 (1961); Sec. Act Release 201 (1934); Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1
S.E.C. 147 (1935).
26 Se Act Release 4434 (1961); Sec. Act Release 1459 (1937); see, SEC v. Dunfee,
CCH FE%. SEc. L REP. 5 91,970 (W.D. Mo. 1966-67).
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which they might cast upon the factual question whether the securities
had in fact come to rest in the hands of resident investors. If the securi-
ties are resold but a short time after their acquisition to a non-resident
this fact, although not conclusive, might support an inference that the
original offering had not come to rest in the state, and that resale there-
fore constituted a part of the process of primary distribution; a stronger
inference would arise if the purchaser involved were a security dealer.2 7
The standard then is "whether the securities had in fact come to rest
in the hands of resident investors";2" that is, whether or not the seller
had purchased his securities with the "view to further distribution" or
with the intention of later reselling them outside the state.2" In short,
the test is a subjective one, dependent by and large upon an ex post facto
inquiry into that elusive realm known as the seller's state of mind.3"
Partially on the basis of his status and possibly his connection with the is-
suer (i.e., was the seller a dealer, an affiliate, a lone speculator, a benign
widow, etc.) but primarily on the basis of the length of time that he held
the securities, 31 a selection is made as to which of his several, varying
"motives" for acquiring the securities was the "principal" one. The hold-
ing period is crucial to this retrospective determination: a resale to a non-
resident effected within a year after purchase would most likely be fatal;3
27 Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961); Sec. Act Release 1459 (1937) (nearly identical language);
see, notes 16 & 19 supra, and accompanying text.
28 Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961) (quote in text at note 27, supra).
29 Authorities cited notes 19 & 27, supra.
30 Authorities cited notes 19, 27 & 31. Cf., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6,
1962), 17 C.F.R. § 231.4552 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sec. Act Release 4552 (1962));
Wheat Report at 160-72 and authorities cited.
31 See authorities cited notes 19, 27 & 30, supra. Mulford, Private Placements and Intra-
state Offerings of Securities, 13 Bus. LAw. 297 (1958) briefly describes the inquiry into
seller's intention as follows:
To obviate improper claims of exemption in such cases, [i.e., resales of 4(2) or
3(a)(11) securities] the Commission feels that issuers and underwriters should re-
quire, at least in all cases where they do not know the facts themselves, detailed state-
ments of the financial condition of the purchaser and his intentions, showing that the
purchaser, for example, did not borrow money to buy the securities so that he will not
likely have the intention or be forced to sell them in the near future to pay his
debts. In other words, the Commission must be shown, if a case is questioned, that a
purchase was not a purchase for deferred sale. Thus a purchase where the purchaser
intends to sell within 6 months, after the capital gains income tax period has
elapsed, or even a year, will not be regarded by the Commission as a purchase for
investment. The Commission will require some evidence of changed circumstances
in the purchaser's personal life or business, not foreseen when he bought the security,
before it will believe that he did in fact purchase it for investment, if he actually
sold it soon after its purchase. If, for example, a few months after his purchase, the
investor decides to go into a new business which needs capital, or his house burns
down, or he has a serious, expensive illness in the family, probably the Commission
would agree that his sale of the security in order to raise funds to meet one of these
emergencies was not evidence that he intended to resell the security when he pur-
chased it. Id. at 299.
Cf. also, e.g., Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957);
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
32 A one-year period was suggested in the Brooklyn Manhattan Transit case as the minimum
period during which it would be presumed that the distribution was still incomplete. 1 S.E.C.
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within one to three years, questionable.33 Thus the law is in this respect
no different than that applied to resale transactions in privately placed
securities.34 It also suffers from most of the very defects criticized in the
Wheat Report.35
B. The "Residency" Requirement
In order to apply the "issue" concept properly and thus confine the
distribution to the state in which the offering is made, it is necessary that
each investor-purchaser be in fact a "resident" of that state. This too has
proved troublesome. For, according to current doctrine, ". . . residence
means more than merely presence in the State-it requires something re-
sembling domicile."3 In order to establish domicil within a particular
state, a person normally "... . must be physically present there ... ,37 and,
in addition, he "... . must intend to make that place his home for the time
at least."38  "The requisite animus is the present intention of permanent
or indefinite residence in a given place or [state], or negatively expressed,
the absence of any present intention of not residing there permanently or
indefinitely."3" Therefore if a potential investor moves into the state
at 162-63 (1935). Thus any resales made during that time would be presumed to be a part
of the distribution process unless the issuer could prove otherwise. The presumption was based
on what appeared to be a statutory presumption of the same concept, i.e., the original one-
year exception to the dealer's exemption in § 4(1) of the '33 Act. Sec. Act Release 1459
(1937) indicated a similar appraisal of the holding period with the following words: "[a~ny
dealer proposing to participate. . . or deal in [an intrastate] issue within a year after its first
public offering, should examine the character of the issue and the proposed or actual manner of
its offering with the greatest care in order to satisfy himself that the distribution will not,
or did not, involve the making of sales to non-residents." The exception to the dealer's exemp-
tion was changed in 1954 to 40 days, see Securities Act § 4(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(3)(Supp.
1970) for the present version. Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961) appears to have intentionally
omitted any reference to a time-period.
33 Presumably any resale to a non-resident made within this period would be safe, so long
as the seller did not intend merely to use 3(a)(11) to avoid registration. Cf., Wheat Report
at 164-70; Mulford, supra, note 31 at 299 (quoted in part).
3 4 Authorities cited notes 30-33, supra.
35 Wheat Report at 160-72.
301963 Special Study at 571. See, S. REP. No. 1036, 83d Cong., 2d. Sess. 13 (1954) and 1
Loss at 598, who on this point states that ". .. the SEC lawyers who drafted the legislative re-
ports [on the 1954 Amendments to the '33 Act] employed one of the recognized bootstrap
techniques of making 'legislative history' by having committees 'approve' an administrative
construction." Id. at 598, n.141.
3 7 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 16 (Proposed Official Draft, Part
I, May 2, 1967).
381d. § 18. This applies to a "Domicil of Choice" as distinguished from a "Domicil of
Origin." Section 15(a) outlines the requirements as follows: "In addition to legal capacity, ac-
quisition of a domicil of choice requires (a) physical presence as described in § 16 [but note
that 'the establishment of a home in a particular dwelling is not necessary .. .') and (b) an
attitude of mind as described in § 18." A "Domicil of Origin" is one "... which a person has
at birth," normally that of his father. Id. § 14.
39 Price v. Price, 156 Pa. St. 617, 626, 27 A. 291, 293 (1893), cited with approval in, Gil-
bert v. David, 235 U.S. 561, 569 (1914). RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs
§ 18, Comment a (Proposed Official Draft, Part I, May 2, 1967) styles this as "the most impor-
tant factor in identifying the proper state... namely, intention or attitude of mind."
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".... with the intention of remaining there for an indefinite time,... it is
to be deemed his place of domicile, notwithstanding he may entertain a
floating intention to return [to his former abode] at some future period." 40
Once having established domicil, however, he keeps it so long as he def-
initely intends to return at some future point in time. He would retain
it even though he had removed himself from his domiciliary state and had
disposed of his dwelling-place there.41
The logical application of this principle may aptly be demonstrated
by several hypotheticals cited in Professor Loss's treatise on Securities Reg-
ulation.4 2  For example, suppose that a California issuer relying on
3(a) (11) sold securities to a military officer who had been stationed in
California for a number of years and whose family occupied off-base
housing; in other words, except for the concept of domicil43 and possibly
federal laws pertaining to the citizenship of military personnel on active
duty,44 he would exhibit all of the usual appearances of a person "domi-
ciled" in California. Yet, having been commissioned elsewhere, e.g., in
his "home-state" of New York, and having the intention of returning at
some later date, legally he would be domiciled in New York.4" In the
case just described, the sale to him would be improper; the exemption
presumably would be lost.4 6  Posit the reverse situation, however, where
the same issuer sells to a "California" officer stationed in New York, and
the sale would meet the requirements of the Act.4 r  Consider further the
case of a person who works on Wall Street and who, having maintained
residences both in the City and in New Jersey, moves his family to Con-
necticut immediately after he acquired the securities.48  Little more need
be said. The concept of "domicil" becomes almost unworkable in situa-
tions such as these. For all practical purposes, 3(a) (11) is simply un-
manageable for sizable offerings intended to be sold in metropolitan areas
the environs of which spill over into neighboring states.49
4 0 STORY, CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 46 at 41 (7th ed. 1872) [§ 46 at 50 (8th ed. 1883)],
cited with approval in, Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561,569 (1914).
4 1 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 15-19 and Comments [esp. § 19]
(Proposed Official Draft, Part I, May 2, 1967). See, 1 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
109-11, 142-54, 181-86 (1935); Stumberg, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 16-30 (3rd ed.
1963).
42 1 L. Loss, SEcURITES REGULATION 599 (2d ed. 1961) [cited generally as 1 Loss].
4 3 See, RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 16 and Comment f; 17 and
Comment d; 18. (Proposed Official Draft, Part I, May 2, 1967).
44 See, e.g., Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 574 (1968).
4 5 Authorities cited notes 41, 43 & 44, supra.
46 1 Loss at 599; see, Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961); SEC v. Capital Funds, Ina, No. A46-60,
Litig. Rel. 1805 (D. Alas. 1960); SEC v. Big Top, Inc., Litig. Rel. 2756 (D. Nev. 1963).
47 1 Loss at 599; cf., Sec. Act Release 1459 (1937). Note, however, that such a case is
unlikely to ever happen in practice.
48 1 Loss at 599. See, RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 19 & 20
(Proposed Official Draft, Part I, May 2, 1967).
49 See, Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961); 1963 Special Study at 571-72.
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Professor Loss argues that a literal interpretation of the word "resi-
dent" in 3(a)(11), rather than the more abstruse notion of domicil,
would be more consistent with the basic purposes of the Act."  As it
now stands, the present construction makes the issuer practically a guar-
antor of each purchaser's "domicil."''  For, under current sanctions, once
a sale to a "non-resident" has been consummated, the issuer, having lost
his exemption, must be prepared to rescind all prior transactions and re-
deem the purchase money paid-even for those made to bona fide "resi-
dents." O: In Loss's view, it would be much more sensible to construe "resi-
dent" as a person who maintains a more or less permanent dwelling-
place within the state;53 intentions then, "floating" or otherwise, would
be immaterial. Not only would such a construction tend to satisfy the
administrative need for certainty, but also it would be more in keeping with
the concept of a wholly "intrastate" exemption. "4 Actually, the matter
has never been litigated;r5 until it is though, counsel must continue to
follow the Commission's suggested interpretation. In any event, it again
illustrates the difficulties of using 3 (a) (11).
C. The Requirement of Doing Business and Investing the Proceeds
Within the State
A somewhat disparate but nonetheless indispensable element of the law
on this subject is the requirement that the offering be restricted to the
state in which the issuer is both resident or incorporated and doing busi-
ness. This of course defines the relevant state to which distribution must
be limited. It too has caused problems. For one, the phrase "doing busi-
ness," which appears in many diverse statutes, can be read in a variety of
ways. Generally its meaning will vary in accordance with the policies
being promoted by the statute under construction. " For purposes of ser-
vice of process, for example, a corporation may be considered "doing
business" within a state if it is "present" in, or has sufficient "minimum
contacts" with, that state.57 Slightly more permanent contacts, such as
plants, offices, resident sales personnel, and the like, might be necessary
before a foreign corporation can be taxed or compelled to "qualify" in
50 1 Loss at 598-99.
51 Id. at 604-05.
52 See text accompanying note 79, infra.
3 1 Loss at 599. See 1 BEALE, supra note 41 at 109-11; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLIcT OF LAWS § 30 & Comment (Proposed Official Draft, Part I, May 2, 1967).
G4 1 Loss at 599.
GUid. at 598.
56Id. See, Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 157 (6th Cir. 1969); 1 BEALE, supra note 41
at 109-22; STUMBERG, supra note 41 at 16-18.
57See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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order to operate there.58 In the case of 3(a) (11), the standard appears
to be perceptibly more stringent: "[iln view of the local character of the
• . . exemption, the requirement that the issuer be doing business in the
state can only be satisfied by the performance of substantial operational
activities in the state of incorporation."'5 9 On more than one occasion, the
Commission's staff has used the word "principal" in characterizing the
amount of activities required.60 And recently, the Sixth Circuit, in Chap-
man v. Dunn,61 used the term "predominant" 2 in its description of the
standard. Although the Chapman terminology may be labeled dictum in
light of the facts of that case,63 still it points to the degree of local con-
nections which the issuer must have before he can sell unregistered securi-
ties in that locality.
At first glance, one may question the concern over terminology. But
more than words are at stake. Many genuinely "local" enterprises do a
considerable amount of interstate business. To restrict the exemption to
firms whose activities are confined solely to their state of incorporation
would hardly be defensible from either a statutory or a policy standpoint;
there are no persuasive reasons for going to this extreme. 64 By the same
token, it would clearly defeat the purpose of the exemption, i.e., "local fi-
nancing by local industries," 65 to require only the minimal presence deemed
sufficient under other statutes. 66 The problem then is where to draw the
58See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Scripto, Inc. v.
Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1945); Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961), -rehearing denied, 366 U.S. 978 (1961); Union
Brokerage v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944).
59 Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961).
601963 Special Study at 571; McCauley, supra note 10 at 950 [Assoc. Gen. Counsel].
61414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969).
62414 F.2d at 159.
63 In Chapman the issuer, a receiver for an Ohio corporation, was a Michigan resident
who was selling, to Michigan residents, fractional undivided interests in oil and gas leases to
properties located in Ohio. The court held that the Michigan issuer was not doing business
within the state for purposes of 3(a)(11) "... when all the income producing property to
which the securities [applied was] located outside the state..... [emphasis added.) 414
F.2d at 159. Hence the court was merely applying the current standard as enunciated in Sec.
Act Release 4434 (1961), which it quoted, and SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc., 157 F. Supp.
824 (S.D. Cal. 1957), which it noted at some length. In light of this, the use of the word
"predominant" at one place in the opinion may be considered unnecessary to the holding.
But see, text at note 67, infra. Nevertheless it has caused concern among local counsel.
64 "The fact that the word 'only' does not modify the 'doing business' clause indicates quite
clearly that the issuer's business need not be confined to the state in which it is resident or
incorporated." [emphasis in original.] 1 Loss at 601. Thus the SEC would have little
statutory justification for interpreting the phrase in this manner. See, McCauley, supra
note 10 at 950. Moreover, such a construction would arguably preclude a local issuer who had
goods or sales personnel permanently located outside the state from ever using 3(a)(11).
But see, Sec. Act Release 1459 (1937).
65 Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961); Sec. Act Release 1459 (1937); Meeker, Advising Your
Client on Securities Problems, 28 OKLA. B. A. J. 1863, 1868 (1957); see, text accompanying
notes 156-64, infra.
66 See text accompanying notes 56-58, supra.
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line. "Substantial operational activities" within the state implies that a
figure less than-but approaching--50%, of the company's total income-
producing assets, i.e., only 30-497o, need to be located there. "Principal"
or "predominant," however, suggests a much higher minimum percentage,
well in excess of 50%. Probably the latter was what Congress had in
mind when it enacted 3(a)(11) .7 Equally important, the "doing busi-
ness" requirement is not a purely formal condition which the issuer must
satisfy in order to avail himself of the exemption. It has also been con-
strued to require that the investor have a financial ". . . interest in the
issuer's separate business within the state."68 This means that most of the
proceeds of the offering must actually be invested in income-producing
assets located within the state. 9 Thus a local enterprise which desires to
expand its operations into nearby states by acquiring out-of-state companies
or their assets would be precluded from doing so with 3(a) (11) funds,
even though its principal operations were conducted locally.70 In effect
then, the "words" determine who qualifies for the exemption and, to a
limited extent, how the proceeds must be allocated. Such is the law of
3 (a) (11)_
II. ACTUAL PRACTICES RESPECTING INTRASTATE
OFFERINGS
A. Limited Utility of the Exemption
Having explored in some detail the content of the rules governing in-
trastate exemptions, it should have become apparent that, for many finan-
cial undertakings, 3(a)(11) is simply unavailable. Either because of
the state in which the issuer is incorporated, 71 the size of the projected of-
fering, the geographical proximity of neighboring states, the scale of the
issuer's operations, or the opportunities for which venture capital is sought,
compliance with the requirements specified above often cannot be obtained.
Perhaps this is as it should be. No doubt there is an overriding federal
policy in favor of registration and its consequent disclosures whenever a
07 See text and sources accompanying notes 156-64, infra.
0S Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961).
6o Id.; Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 159 (6th Cir. 1969); SEC v. Truckee Showboat,
Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957); see discussion note 63, supra.
7 0 Authorities cited, note 69, supra. Another factor to be considered here is the time
frame during which the proceeds are to be allocated. For example even though the issuer
plans on using most of the offering's proceeds locally, e.g., 85%, still he could conceivably
jeopardize the offering by investing the first portion received, i.e., 15%, in an out-of-state
venture. This is because the SEC might be reluctant to accept his claim that the rest of
funds have been designated for local use only. The Commission took this position in Tait v.
North American Equitable Life Assurance Co., 92 Ohio L. Abs. 551, 25 Ohio Ops.2d 451,
194 N.E.2d 456 (C.P. 1963), aff'd per curiam, 195 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio App. 1963), app. dis-
missed, 176 Ohio St. 240, 199 N.E.2d 3 (1964).
71 Many local concerns still find it advantageous to incorporate outside the state in which
their principal business activities are conducted, e.g., such as in Delaware.
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substantial block of investment securities is to be offered to the public;72
this is especially true where distribution through organized channels is
contemplated. 3 Because of this, the SEC has had more than adequate justi-
fication for construing 3(a) (11) as narrowly as it obviously has.74 In-
deed, it would have had little authority for doing otherwise. As a result
of such a posture though, the use of 3(a) (11), which has been character-
ized as being "loaded with dynamite, '75 should be viewed with the utmost
caution.
Moreover the sanctions that can be invoked against its misuse reinforce
the admonition. They can be severe. The following constitutes the mea-
sures which may be taken once the SEC discovers a violation:
(1) revocation of broker-dealer registration for the principal under-
writers and distributing dealers;78
(2) threat of an injunction to prohibit further distribution until a
registration statement is filed;77
(3) compulsory disclosure of the issuer's contingent liability under
section 12(1) with respect to those shares or units already sold
in violation of section 5 ;78
(4) SEC insistence on an offer of rescission and redemption for all
transactions consummated prior to the violation, including those
involving residents of the state;79 and
(5) criminal prosecution under section 24.80
In sum, although a technical violation may pass undetected due to the
absence of a filing requirement,"' the price of a 3(a) (11) failure is hardly
worth the risk of even one innocent mistake.
There are practical reasons, in addition to those previously mentioned,
72 Securities Act preamble, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
73 1963 Special Study at 571; cf., Sec. Act Release 1459 (1937).
74 1 LOSS at 591,604; Sosin, supra note 10 at 111, 112.
75 Gadsby, The SEC and the Financing of Small Business, 14 Bus. LAw. 144, 148 (1958)
[Former Chairman of the SEC.]
76Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(5)(D), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(5)(D)(Supp.
1970). See, e.g., Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1970); Whitehall
Corp., 38 S.E.C. 259 (1958); 1 Loss at 604.
77 Securities Act § 20, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77t (1963); see, 1 Loss at 604.
78 1 Loss at 604; see, e.g., Texas Glass Mfg. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630,634-35 (1958).
79 1 Loss at 604; cf., Edsco Mfg. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 865 (1961).
80 Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77x (1963). It should be noted that proof of
wilfulness would be required under § 24. Loss also states that there have been relatively
few criminal prosecutions of any kind under the Securities Act, 1 Loss at 603, 1994.
811963 Special Study at 571-75. In the 1963 Special Study, the SEC recommended
legislation which would have obligated issuers to give "notice of substantial offerings" under
3(a)(11) before they were made. This proposal was never explicitly adopted. It should
be noted, however, that many issuers using 3(a)(11) are likely to become subject to the report-
ing requirements of the '34 Act within a relatively short time after the proceeds are received,
see text and sources accompanying notes 151-53, infra. Hence the Commission will eventually
become aware of the fact that a sizable 3(a)(11) offering was made anyway, even though
no one actually complains about improper sales, and so forth.
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which limit the usefulness of the exemption. An obvious one is that fre-
quently alternative exemptions are available for the same issue. Private
offerings under section 4(2), "small" offerings under Regulation A,82
and conceivably even section 3(a) (10) exchange offerings which are ad-
ministered and approved by state supervisory authorities,3 might be placed
in this category. The relative merits and safety afforded by each, of
course, would depend upon the issuer's circumstances and the anticipated
market for his securities. But a private offering, if feasible, would seem
to be notably less hazardous than its intrastate counterpart, now that
adoption of the Wheat Report's proposed rules is in the offing. The
basis for this assertion is two-fold: (1) Many underwriters and dealers
probably are, or should be, considerably more familiar with their custom-
ers' circumstances in the case of a private offering than they would be in a
3(a) (11) situation.8 4  This being so, they are in a much better position
to evaluate the potential impact of an intended resale on the availability
of the issuer's 4(2) exemption. Also, (2) assuming that the Wheat Re-
port's proposals are put into effect and that similar rules governing
3(a) (11) are not, then there would appear to be less risk of investor re-
sales imperiling an otherwise valid offering made under the former exemp-
tion than there would be under the latter. This observation follows not
only because of the specificity with which the Wheat Report's rules are
stated,8" but also because of the broker-dealer's greater knowledge and
duty of inquiry under the new rules.86 As a consequence, where there is a
realistic choice between the two, the 4(2) exemption would generally seem
preferable. Furthermore, the same could always be said about Regula-
tion A offerings.8 7
Another reason tending to discourage intrastate offerings is a bit more
subtle but equally compelling: because of the risks involved, many under-
writers will not handle them.88 NASD review of those offerings under-
written by its members 80 is illustrative of the general apprehension regard-
82 Securities Act § 3(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(b)(1963), and SEC Reg. A (explicitly), 16
C.F.R. § 162.11 (1970).
83 Securities Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(a)(10) (1963). See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 1707.04 (Page 1964). Admittedly, this is seldom a practical alternative, except
in very unusual circumstances.
840a the presumption of the sophisticated investor, see text and sources accompanying
notes 166-70, 173-75, intra.
85For a discussion of the objective standards of the new rules, see text accompanying
notes 122-36, infra.
80 See text at note 84, supra, and text and sources at notes 133-35, infra, on the broker's
obligations.
87 1 Loss at 603, text at n.166.
881963 Specil Study at 572. One prominent local underwriting firm, for example, han-
dles only debt securities under 3(a)(11) because its officers feel that offerings of equity securi-
ties are simply too difficult to control properly.
80CCH NASD NMANuAL 5 2151.02 at 2025-27. This is one aspect of a continuing re-
view by the Board of Governors of the fairness of all offerings which NASD members
1970]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
ing their use. Consequently, an issuer who is reluctant to turn to
underwriters specializing in such offerings90 may simply be directed to
other modes of financing by those with whom he regularly deals. A third
factor which may affect the utility of 3(a) (11) is the onerousness of a
particular state's blue sky law. In some cases, disclosure requirements of
the local securities law may be almost as exacting as the federal. In Ohio
for example, registration by qualification, 91 which calls for much of the
same information as the '33 Act,92 would be required of those issuers un-
able to meet the conditions for registration by description. 3 At a mini-
mum, this would apply to all newly-formed companies and to existing
concerns whose average net earnings fall below statutory standards.94 Since
Ohio, like other states, permits the filing of a federal registration state-
ment to serve as a substitute for the prescribed forms,95 an issuer who is
obliged to register by qualification might as well file under both laws, es-
pecially in questionable cases.98 The differences in cost, time and paper
work, although substantial enough, probably do not warrant the risk of
avoiding federal registration. In conclusion, an issuer would be well ad-
vised to use something other than 3(a) (11), unless he clearly fits the
description of a "local industry" seeking "local financing."
In spite of all that has been said, the available evidence indicates that
3 (a) (11) is still widely employed in certain states.
Some indication of the volume of offerings of this general character is
afforded by the experience of those States which do not exempt small or
private issues from the permit requirements of their securities laws. One
such State, California, issues approximately 15,000 permits a year. This
may be compared with approximately 2,307 registration statements and
1,065 regulation A offerings filed with the Commission from the entire
country during fiscal 1962.97
underwrite or participate in. Accordingly, the member involved must submit the prospectus,
all offering circulars, his notice of intention or other written documents with respect to under-
writing arrangements, compensations, etc.
90 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(a) (Supp. 1970), and 1963
Special Study at 573. Frequently these underwriters do nothing else but promote local
issues; hence they claim exemption from broker-dealer registration by virtue of § 15(a).
Also, see discussion note 105, infra.
91 Ohio Revised Code Ann. § 1707.09 (Page 1964).
92Id. § 1707.09(A)-(J). Cf., Securities Act § 7, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77g(1963), & Schedule
A. Although in practice state corporate securities agencies seldom call for all of the detailed
disclosures that may be required by the SEC, still many local counsel treat them in much
the same way, especially with respect to the information contained in offering circulars.
93 Ohio Revised Code Ann., § 1707.05, .08 (Page 1964).
941d. § 1707.05(A).
951d. § 1707.09(K), .21.
9 6 The Ohio Division of Corporate Securities occasionally requires, as a part of the regis-
tration process, a "no action" letter from the SEC for any "questionable" 3(a)(11) offering,
i.e., questionable in the sense that the examiner suspects that a particular issuer might be
doing too much out-of-state business.
971963 Special Study at 571. "There is no way of knowing how many of these offerings
occur every year, but the number is unquestionably substantial in view of the fact that there
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The number of permits issued, of course, does not mean that California
had 15,000 3(a) (11) "offerings," as most of these permits were undoubt-
edly issued for closely-held corporations. Nonetheless the figure does
suggest that there are many such offerings. 9s Ohio has been similarly
prolific. In 1969 alone, for example, it has been estimated that possibly
as many as 780 such offerings were made throughout the state. 9 And a
number of them are sizable.
Notwithstanding the general exclusory rule of the editors of the financial
manuals [because the editors generally feel that 3(a)(11) issues are too
small to be of public interest, one such manuall alone listed during 1961
at least 90 offerings [which were] apparently made pursuant to the intra-
state exemption. Of these 90, 15 were for amounts totaling at least $1
million, and another 15 were in amounts ranging from $500,000 to $1
million. 00
The reasons for this phenomenon are varied, but in the main they may be
attributed to the following factors: (1) the existence of a broad, cohesive,
geographic area with a thriving, relatively self-contained industrial and
agricultural base-all within the territorial boundaries of a single state;
(2) the existence of a large, affluent, and urbanized population whose in-
come is equitably distributed, as compared with other states, and whose
proclivity for investing is predictable;: 1 (3) the general feeling that fed-
eral registration is more laborious and, due to the SEC backlog, consider-
ably more time-consuming. Especially because of the latter, issuers ur-
gently in need of additional working capital may be pressed into relying
upon 3(a) (11), even though prudence might dictate a different course of
action. Other factors may also exert some influence on the utility of the
exemption. 102 Ohio, for example, formerly did not require a written ex-
are over a million corporations in the United States, most of which are not represented
on trading markets." Id.
USThe 1963 Special Study notes that "[iln 1957, the regional offices of the Commission
made a 'rough estimate' of the number of filings that would be made annually in their re-
spective regions if issuers making offerings pursuant to [3(a)(11)] were required to notify
the Commission. The Chicago regional office, for example, estimated 921 such filings...
the Fort Worth regional office estimated 510.. Id. at 573, n.225.
0 This figure too is a very "rough estimate," based on the total filings with the Ohio
Division of Corporate Securities during 1969. The Division guessed that about 15% or
more of the 5200 filings were 3(a)(11) offerings (i.e., 1566 registrations by qualifications,
plus 3651 registrations by description=5217; 15% of 5200=780). Again this is by no
means an accurate figure, but it is an indication of how frequently the exemption is used.
Also, some of these offerings easily compare with the data cited in the 1963 Special Study
at note 100, infra. See, e.g., Sosin, supra note 10 at 112-14.
100 1963 Special Study at 573.
101The general conditions mentioned here are particularly prevalent in those few states
where the exemption is often used, e.g., California, Texas, Ohio, etc. Compare the situation
existing on the Eastern seaboard, or in the South where the conditions are not quite so propi-
tious (i.e., the geography, location of population centers, or general economic base simply do
not lend themselves to large, publicly distributed 3 (a) (11) issues).
102 In Ohio, for example, there is no statutory requirement that each purchaser be given
a prospectus. Cf., Securities Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e(b)(1963).
1970]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
amination of its securities salesmen.103  Consequently, many intrastate
underwriting specialists0 4 relied upon a part-time, non-professional sales
force for the allotment of their issues amongst the latter's friends and
neighbors. Such practices are likely to change. Due to the exam require-
ment, the emergence of SECO rules, 105 and possibly the tight money mar-
ket, more and more of these dealers will be inclined to register as NASD
members or else discontinue altogether. In either event, their participation
in such undertakings should tend to decrease in the future. But the present
situation in Ohio illustrates both the pervasiveness of intrastate offerings
and the manner in which they are often conducted.
B. Local Practices to Insure Compliance
Since 3(a) (11) is still so extensively used in certain areas, the prac-
tices employed to comply with it deserve some attention. Accordingly,
the following is a list of such practices:
1. Basic Method: Right to Refuse Issuance or Registration of Trans-
fer. It is generally assumed that the most effective means of guarding
against improper sales is the reservation, on behalf of the issuer, of a
right to refuse issuance-and registration of transfer on corporate books
-of the shares purchased by a non-resident.106 This right, which is in-
cluded in the subscription agreement, is usually reserved for a period of 18
to 24 months or longer. It enables the transfer agent to monitor all
transactions in the security, i.e., both subscriptions and transfers, and to
invoke the right whenever the address, occupation, or other circumstances
suggest that the purchaser may be domiciled in another state. 0 T Ordinarily,
since very little trading develops anyway until long after the distribution
is completed, such monitoring does not represent a burdensome adminis-
trative procedure. It is obviously no panacea though. It does not deter
improper solicitation by errant salesmen, nor does it safeguard against
103 This requirement was adopted in October, 1969; Ohio Revised Code Ann. § 1707.16
(E)(Page Supp. 1970).
104 See note 90, supra.
105 SECO rules are issued pursuant to § 15(b)(8) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(8)(Supp. 1970), for those broker-dealers registered under § 15 who
have not joined the NASD (see § 15A). Unless a broker-dealer deals strictly in local issues
and claims exemption from registration under § 15(a), he would be subject to these rules.
106 See, ISRAELS & GUT'iAN, MODERN SEcuRITEs TRANsFERs §§ 4,06, 8.11 & 9.01-.06
(1967) and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-401 (1962 Official Text) on the issuer's duty
to register transfer. [The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 Official Text) will herein-
after be cited as the UCC].0 7
'The reasonableness of this type of restriction [on transfer) has been upheld in state
courts." IsRAELs & GuTTMAN, supra note 106, § 4.06 at 405 [citing cases on 4(2) securi-
ties]. Moreover, the resident subscriber, if he is aware of the problem, should be reluctant
to sell anyway; for an improper sale would not only be a breach of his covenant, but it would
also make him a statutory underwriter. Also note that this type of restriction is enforceable
only against original subscribers and transferees with knowledge of it, see UCC § 8-204
(quoted below) and text accompanying notes 108-09, infra.
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administrative oversight and purchaser misrepresentation. Further and
perhaps more significant, the right, which is a restriction on transfer, is
not binding upon a subsequent transferee unless he has actual knowledge
of it.1 8  Therefore, where a resident investor has contracted to sell to a
non-resident, notwithstanding his covenant to the contrary, his promisee
should be able to compel transfer, even though to do so might endanger
the issuer's exemption.0 9  Hence other control measures, particularly
the restrictive legend on the security certificates,110 are still necessary.
2. Legends on the Prospectus. Legends on the prospectus, the sub-
scription agreement, and soliciting materials always contain a provision
stating, inter alia, that the offering is made pursuant to a 3(a) (11) ex-
emption and that the purchaser "agrees to buy for investment and other
than with a view to resale or other transfer to non-residents" for at least
two to three years."' Although usually considered a matter of form and
seldom understood by the average investor, nevertheless these legends are
important in several respects. They provide some degree of constructive
notice essential to the enforceability of the aforementioned right to refuse
issuance or registration of transfer. In addition, they may actually fore-
warn an unsuspecting subscriber of the impropriety of his subscription or
intended resale. They may also advise the less informed of the character
of the issue. Therefore, even though not fully appreciated by the average
investor, they are of unquestionable value.
3. Statements of Residency and Letters of Investment Intent. A pro
forvna declaration of residency and investment intent is occasionally pro-
vided for in the subscription agreement, but these are generally thought of
as worthless." '  Since they may reinforce the notice provisions of the
prospectus' legend, inclusion is desirable; however, they hardly warrant
the use of extra printed forms.
108 UCC § 8-204 reads: "Unless noted conspicuously on the security a restriction on trans-
fer imposed by the issuer even though otherwise lawful is ineffective except against a person
with actual knowledge of it." See, UCC § 1-201(25); ISRAELs & GuTrMAN, supra note 106,
§ 4.06 at 407-08; Ohio Revised Code Ann. § 1701.25(B) (Page 1964).
109 See, UCC §§ 8-301, -316; ISRAELS & GUTTMAN, supra note 106, § 4.03, .06; White-
hall Corp., 38 S.E.C. 259, 268-70 (1958). See also, Comment to UCC § 8-204.
110 See text accompanying notes 113-15, infra.
1 1 1 As to the reasons for this, see text and sources accompanying notes 27-34, supra.
Sometimes the time period is omitted and the transfer agent merely requires an opinion of
counsel before registration of transfer is permitted.
112 This is particularly so in the case of 3(a) (11) securities.
"... [I]t is the practice in such cases to obtain from each purchaser in a private or
intrastate offering a so-called 'investment letter' stating that he is acquiring the se-
curities for investment and not with a view to the distribution thereof to the public.
The Commission does not regard a simple statement to that effect as sufficient,
and perhaps it is right. I know of a case where a man signed such a statement at
a settlement on the 20th floor of an office building in New York, picked up his stock
certificates, went downstairs to the ground floor and turned the certificates over to
his broker with an order to sell them on the Stock Exchange at the market."
Mulford, supra, note 31 at 299.
Sec, Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961).
1970]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
4. Restrictive Legend on the Certificates. A legend on stock or
bond certificates, which states that they were distributed pursuant to a
3(a)(11) exemption and which notes the issuer's right to restrict owner-
ship to bona fide residents, would seem to be a fairly effective method of
protecting the offering. It certainly would inhibit casual inadvertent re-
sales. Yet rarely is this done locally. Probably the best explanation for
this is that many counsel instinctively feel that such legends reflect ad-
versely on the value of the securities. Be that as it may, since the Com-
mission has all but made them mandatory for privately placed securities,"'
similar treatment for 3 (a) (11) securities now seems in order.
Careful precautions by the issuer of the securities will be essential to as-
sure that a public offering does not result through resales . . . . Al-
though such assurance cannot be obtained merely by the use of an appro-
priate legend on stock certificates .. .or by other procedures in common
use, such as appropriate instructions to transfer agents, these devices may
serve a very useful policing function. When the securities are subsequently
transferred . . . , the use of the legend on the certificates helps not only
to prevent possible violation of the Act but also to alert the buyer to the
restricted character of the securities he has acquired. It may thus assist
in the prevention of fraud.
. "The Commission will regard the presence or absence of such legend
...as a significant indication of whether the circumstances surrounding
an offering are consistent with exemption under section 4(2) of the Act.
[Emphasis added.] 114
Moreover, as previously noted, without such a legend, the issuer may be
thwarted in his attempt to prevent improper resales and thus to control the
distribution of his securities. 15
5. Educating Dealers and Salesmen. All of the aforementioned pro-
cedures ".... serve a very useful policing function""" and therefore ought
to be employed. None of them though are foolproof. Consequently, edu-
cating those engaged in the distributive process is still a very important
part of counsel's role in the undertaking. Instruction to dealers and sales-
men about the necessity for limiting offers and sales to residents, with
emphasis on the seriousness of the offense if the exemption is lost, should
be made at periodic intervals.1 7  Only in this way can the issuer be con-
"3 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 15, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Sec. Act
Release 4997 (1969)].
"141d. Although obviously written for 4(2) securities, these statements would appear to
apply with equal force to 3 (a) (11) securities.
315 See text and sources accompanying notes 107-09, supra.
116 Sec. Act Release 4997 (1969).
117 Local counsel report that United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (1968) is an ex-
cellent incentive for keeping salesmen attentive at such lectures. Some underwriters and dealers
require signed statements to the effect that the salesman is aware of the restrictions in a
particular 3 (a) (11) offering.
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fident that he has taken every reasonable step to insure compliance with
the Act.
III. POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF THE WHEAT REPORT'S
PROPOSED RULES TO 3 (a) (11)
The foregoing review of the basic rules and practices concerning intra-
state offerings was undertaken primarily for the purpose of indicating
fundamental points of similarity between 3(a) (11) and the private offer-
ing exemption authorized in section 4(2) of the '33 Act. To anyone fa-
miliar with the gloss that has been accumulating over the years respecting
the latter, their likeness should be evident. 8 The basic question of sub-
jective investment intent, the uncertainty surrounding the time required
before resale is allowed, the difficulty of deciding what constitutes a "dis-
tribution" when questionable transfers are made-all of these are problems
common to the use of both exemptions." 9 Indeed, even the techniques
that have been developed to preserve them are similar. 20  And, as earlier
noted, both suffer from many of the same defects.12' Now that the ob-
jective standards set forth in the Wheat Report's proposed rules are ex-
pected to remedy many of the difficulties formerly experienced under sec-
tion 4(2), it seems desirable to consider the potential application of these
standards to common questions arising under 3(a) (11). In order to do
this, it is first necessary to outline the proposed rules, insofar as they are
pertinent to the point under consideration.
A. Description of the Proposed Rules
The methodology of the new system is to provide objective tests in lieu
of expositive phrases for the definition of key statutory terms. By this
technique, the system effectively excludes certain specifically delimited
transactions from the general prohibitions of the '33 Act. It does not,
however, affect the basic rules regulating the initial offering and sale of
privately placed securities; these remain unchanged. 22
Proposed rules 160, 161 and 162123 contain the basic framework.
118 The Wheat Report has an excellent summary of the law on 4(2), id. at 160-77. For
additional sources, see notes 30-31, supra, and 173-74, infra.119 The "integration" problem, see text and sources at notes 11-13, supra, is common to
both. The "change of circumstance" doctrine is an integral part of the question of investment
intent, see Wheat Report at 166-70 and text and sources at note 30-31, supra. Others could
be mentioned, such as whether "gifts" to non-residents invalidate the exemption, see 1 Loss
at 593, n.124.
120 Mulford, supra, note 31; see generally, text and sources accompanying notes 106-17,
mupra.
121 See authority cited note 35, supra, and accompanying text.
122 For a brief description of the basic requirements concerning 4(2) offerings, see text
and sources accompanying notes 166-70, 173-75, infra. A fortiori, a public intrastate offer-
ing would not be subject to the new rules.
123 Sec. Act Release 4997 (1969). Hereinafter, the proposed rules will be cited without
further reference to this release, except where appropriate.
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Rule 160 includes within the definition of statutory "underwriter"' 2 4
".. . any person who disposes of a restricted security (as defined in Rule
161) in a distribution (as defined in Rule 162)." "A 'restricted secu-
rity means any security acquired directly or indirectly from its issuer, or
from an affiliate of its issuer [i.e., a control person],' 25 in a transaction
or chain of transactions none of which was a public offering or other pub-
lic disposition."'' 2  Ordinarily a "restricted security" will remain such for
a period of five years after which it ceases to be so. The termination of
this status, however, is expressly conditioned on the issuer's gross receipts.
If he has received less than $250,000 in "gross revenues from operations"
during each of the five consecutive years following the date of the initial
offering, then the securities retain their restricted status until the condi-
tion is met. The reason for the inclusion of this additional restriction
was to distinguish between active going-concerns and bogus corporate shells.
Without the distinction, the Commission feared that the latter might be
used to circumvent the rules. 127  Rule 162 defines the term "distrubition"
in section 2(11) as ". .. any public offering of a security excepting only
a transaction which meets all of the following requirements:' 28
(1) Qualified Issuer. The issuer must be a "'qualified" issuer un-
der Rule 163 at the time of the transaction, i.e., it must be a "reporting"
company or one which is obligated to file regular reports on its business
affairs under § 13 or § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In general, this would include any corporation with a class of securities
listed on a national securities exchange, § 12(b), or registered under §
12(g), or subject to § 15(d) of the '34 Act.'29 Note, however, that if
a reporting issuer becomes delinquent in his reporting, i.e., "deficient or
tardy," or if he becomes subject to certain administrative proceedings
before the SEC, he could lose his status as such, either temporarily or
permanently.
(2) Holding Period for Restricted Securities. Generally the required
holding period for restricted securities "beneficially owned by the offeror"
124 Reference should be made to authorities cited notes 18-19 supra.
125Rule 101 of the proposed rules defines an "affiliate" or a "person 'affiliated' with,
a specified person, [as] a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more inter-
mediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the person speci-
fied." Sec. Act Release 4997 (1969). Cf., Securities Act, §§ 2(11) & 15, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b
(11) & 77o (1963).
126Rule 161(a) [emphasis added.] This would clearly exclude most 3(a)(11) securities
from the operation of the new rules, see note 122, supra, as the "restrictions" on their dispo-
sition emanate from different sources.
127 Wheat Report at 203.
128 Sec. Act Release 4997 (1969) [emphasis added.] Section 2(11) is quoted at note 18,
supra.
129 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq. (1963). As to the § 12(g)
requirements, see note 151, infra, and accompanying text.
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is "at least one year prior to the transaction" or sale. 30 This general rule,
however, must be qualified somewhat. It is limited to situations where
the "offeror" (which includes his immediate family and dependent rela-
tives, plus controlled trusts, estates, and corporations)' 31 has paid the "'full
purchase price of such securities" and where he has not ". . . purchased
or agreed to purchase any other restricted securities of the same issuer,
whether or not of the same class as the securities offered by him."'1' Rule
162 goes on to provide specific holding periods for almost every type of
investment security and for most of the various ways in which such se-
curities could have been acquired, e.g., stock dividends, convertible se-
curities, pledged securities, those acquired in business reorganizations, and
those acquired by reason of death, gift or trust termination.
(3) Unsolicited Brokerage. This restriction attempts to limit the
methods by which an offering can be made to those normally associated
with ordinary trading transactions. It is designed to preclude the kind of
intensive sales campaign which is often employed in circulating large blocks
of securities among the investing public. 33 Accordingly, the rule in sub-
stance provides that "[t]he offering must be made through a broker acting
as agent for the seller [and not as a principal in his own behalf.] The
broker may not solicit buy orders [only sell orders] and may charge no
more than the minimum commission applicable on the exchange on which
the security is listed or no more than the minimum commission applicable
on the New York Stock Exchange if the security . "..,34 is traded over-the-
counter. In addition, "[t]he offeror may not solicit or arrange for others
to solicit buy orders and [he] may not make any payment except the speci-
fied commission in connection with the transaction." 5
(4) Limitation on Amount of Securities. The amount of securities
involved in the transaction must not be ". . . substantial in relation to the
number of shares or units of the security outstanding and the aggregate
volume of trading in the security." By the figures summarized below,
this rule in effect limits the quantity of securities that may be publicly
sold by the offeror within any given six-month period to the following:
130 Rule 162(c)(1).
131 Rule 162(b).
132 Rule 162(c)(1). This is the solution to the "fungibility" problem; see, Wheat Report
at 172-74.
133 See Wheat Report at 20-1.
134 Quote in the text is the SEC's summary of Rule 162 (a) (3) in Sec. Act Release 4997(1969).
13r Id. The broker's part in the transaction is provided for in Rule 164. In effect it ex-
empts the broker from the provisions of § 5 (see § 4(4) of the '33 Act) where he has effected
a transaction ".. acting as agent for the account of (1) an affiliate of the issuer of the securities
which are the subject of the transaction, or (2) any person disposing of a restricted security, as
defined in Rule 161 ... [but] only if [he] has made reasonable inquiry of his customer and
has no grounds for believing and does [not ?] believe that the transactions constitute a dis-
tribution as defined in Rule 162."
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(a) for over-the-counter securities, approximately 1% of the shares or
units outstanding; and (b) for securities traded on an exchange, the lesser
of (i) 1% of the shares or units outstanding or (ii) the "largest aggregate
reported volume of trading on [all] securities exchanges during any one
week within the four calendar weeks preceding . . ." the placing of a sell
order.136
To recapitulate, a transaction meeting the requirements specified in sub-
paragraphs (1) through (4) of Rule 162(a) will not be deemed a "dis-
tribution" and the person effecting such a transaction will not be labeled
a statutory "underwriter." Hence he will be exempted by section 4(1) .13
In simpler words, any purchaser of a reporting company's restricted securi-
ties, including a control person, will usually be permitted to sell limited
quantities thereof in an ordinary trading transaction after the one year
holding period has elapsed. He may do this without registration and
without affecting the issuer's 4(2) exemption.138
As previously intimated, the significance of the above rules lies in the
objectivity with which key statutory terms are defined. By means of these
tests, both the SEC and the securities industry should be able to deter-
mine--quickly and definitively-whether or not a person contemplating
resale of restricted securities was about to engage in a prohibited trans-
action. No longer will the "passage of indeterminate amounts of time"'39
and the seller's state of mind or other nebulous circumstances' 40 be con-
trolling. No longer will the "lack of objective tests" provide an "unfortu-
nate leeway for the unscrupulous" by tempting them to "cut the statutory
corner."'' Furthermore, no harm should befall the investing public as
a result of these new rules. Since they ". . . operate to inhibit the creation of
public markets in securities of issuers which do not disclose information to
the public in appropriate filings with the Commission .. . the funda-
mental aims of federal securities law will still be fulfilled. 43 Such are
the benefits expected of the new Rules.
B. Impact of the Proposed Rules on 3(a)(11)
Whether these benefits could be extended to comparable transactions
in 3(a) (11) securities is the central focus of the succeeding discussion.
With regard to the requirement of ultimate distribution to resident in-
136 Rule 162(a)(4); cf., SEC Rule 154(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.154(b)(1970). See, Wheat Re-
port at 20-21, 191-202, and note 4, supra.
'37 Wheat Report at 203-05.
138 Rule 180, Sec. Act Release 4997 (1969).
139 Wheat Report at 174.
14 0 See text and sources accompanying notes 30-33, supra.
141 Wheat Report at 177.
14 2 Sec. Act Release 4997 (1969).
143 Id.; Securities Act, preamble, 48 Star. 74 (1933).
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vestors, it can be argued, persuasively it seems, that the new rules could be
applied to 3(a) (11), at least to the extent of regulating subsequent re-
sales outside the state. In order to fully appreciate the content of this state-
ment, several things must be kept in mind. First the proposed rules, if
so applied, would not affect the present requirement that the offering be
confined to residents of the state in question. Those in the selling group
would still be obliged to insure that each subscriber was a bona fide "resi-
dent"'144 of the state. Indeed, by the very terms of the statute, this aspect
of the current law could hardly be changed. By the same token though, the
basic requirements governing the initial placement of unregistered securi-
ties under section 4(2), as enunciated in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,'45
are likewise unaffected by the new rules. The issuer is still constrained
to limit his offering to an insubstantial number of "sophisticated" investors
whose relationship with the issuer affords them access to financial infor-
mation. "' Second, application of the Wheat Report's standards to
3(a) (11) would not permit the widespread circulation of unseasoned, un-
registered securities immediately after issuance. Here again, the new rules
do not allow that under 4(2) either. The holding period, the quantity
limitations, and especially the issuer's "qualification" prevent that from
happening. In fact, the effect of the change would not be all that notice-
able. Rather than allowing the interstate sale of any 3(a) (11) security
within a few years after the initial offering, as the current rule does, the
new standards would actually restrict such sales for as much as five years,
in the case of a non-reporting company. Hence they would ". . . operate
to inhibit the creation of public markets in securities of issuers which do
not disclose information to the public .... ,,4 Only where the issuer does
disclose the required information would the rules permit earlier interstate
trading, and then only by a year or two. Thus the change would not
involve a radical departure from existing law; and it would conform to
projected changes in a comparable area of the law.
The textual aspect of the argument is equally persuasive. By reading
the term "distribution" in the same way that it is defined in Rule 162(a),
with the word "interstate" being substituted for the word "public" per-
haps, then any resale or other transfer to a non-resident, which was con-
summated at least a year after the initial offering date, would not be
deemed a "part of the process of primary distribution."'148 This of course
would apply only where the other standards are met; that is, the sale would
144 Presumably the SEC would adopt Professor Loss's suggestion here, see text and sources
at notes 50-54, supra.
145 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
146 Op. Gen. Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935), 17 C.F.R. § 231.285
(1970); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Sec. Act Release 4552 (1962); text
and sources at notes 31, 166-70, 173-75.
147 Sec. Act Release 4997 (1969).
148 Quoted in text at note 27, supra.
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also have to be an unsolicited brokerage transaction in limited amounts of
a qualified issuer's "restricted" (i.e., 3(a) (11)1 securities. In the words
of the current phraseology then, the original offering would have "come
to rest" in the hands of resident investors "at the time of completion of
ultimate distribution,"' 49 which would be at the end of one year if the is-
suer was a reporting company. In the case of a non-reporting company,
the "distribution" period would terminate when the issuer qualifies or when
the securities cease to be restricted. It should pointedly be emphasized that
such a construction would allow the intentional resale of 3 (a) (11) securi-
ties to non-residents. It would do so even though there was no mistake as
to the residency of the purchaser. Like 4(2) then, intentional resales un-
der the conditions just described would not be prohibited, nor would the
issuer's exemption be lost. In sum, the phraseology fits, or could be
adapted to fit, 3(a)(11).
Furthermore the benefits that would accrue to all concerned should be
the same by and large. Attorneys would have relatively firm guidelines
on which to base their advice. Broker-dealers would have a fairly clear
idea, in terms of time, quantities, and methods, as to whether their clients
were about to engage in a "distribution" or not. Investors would know
with reasonable certainty what the terms of their subscription were. And
the Commission, when confronted with suspected violations, would know,
or would be able to decide as easily as it now can, whether to act.110
Further, the public would not be exposed to the temptation of investing
in speculative, unseasoned securities any more than it now is under current
law. Indeed, it might even be less so. For, as previously stated, the new
rules, or a reasonable likeness thereof, would preclude interstate sales of
3(a) (11) securities for as much as five years, unless the issuer becomes a
reporting company. As the rule now stands, resales can be made within
a few years irrespective of the issuer's status. The key point then is that the
time when interstate trading could begin would turn, not so much on the
seller's state of mind or other largely meaningless circumstances, but on
the "qualification" of the issuer. This is the essence of the new rules.
Thus adoption of similar rules for 3(a)(11) would not only provide
similar benefits, but it would also result in a much more uniform applica-
tion of the law.
At this juncture one might wonder as to how many local businesses
would ever qualify as reporting companies, even if the rules were applied
to 3(a) (11). This would be hard to ascertain with any degree of exactitude,
since many issuers using 3(a) (11) would be newly-formed, and so forth.
But local counsel estimate that an appreciable number would be affected.
This is because more and more local firms now fall within the express
149 Quoted in text at notes 27 & 17, supra.
150 1963 Special Study at 571-75. See discussion note 81, supra.
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terms of section 12(g) of the '34 Act; 1' therefore they already are, or
soon will be, reporting companies. In fact, more than a few intrastate is-
sues have been priced at about $ 1 ,000,000.152 Should the firm's gross as-
sets exceed that figure and should 500 or more investors subscribe, then
even a new issuer would become a reporting company within a year or so
after the offering date.0 3 Consequently, application of the Wheat Re-
port's standards to 3 (a) (11) should not be an idle act.
Finally, and most important, it should be emphasized that all of the
conditions and limitations specified in the new rules do not have to be
carried over in toto. If preferable, the holding period could be length-
ened, the quantity restrictions lowered, and so on. The figures need not
be the same, only the certainty with which the rules are stated.
If this suggestion proves unworkable or unacceptable, then at the
very least, the standards could be used as guidelines for determining the
issuer's liability when inadvertent casual resales are made. That is, un-
der what is assumed to be the present rule, the issuer faces the threat of
absolute liability whenever a single improper transfer occurs. This threat
is presumably undiminished by the fact that the seller supposed the pur-
chaser to be domiciled in the state.' 4 But if a standard of due care was
imposed upon the 3(a)(11) issuer, then the aforementioned standards
could serve as a measure of the seller's intent, i.e., whether he had purchased
with a "view" to, or had participated in, the "distribution" of the securi-
ties.1'5 Then any unintentional transaction effected in a manner like that
described above would not make the seller a statutory "underwriter" and
would not destroy the issuer's exemption, provided of course that the pro-
cedures outlined in Part II were otherwise followed. This particular ap-
plication of the standards would not end the inquiry into the seller's state
of mind, but at least it would add some objectivity to the search. How-
ever, in view of this major defect, the previously asserted suggestion would
seem preferable. Although the former is recommended, both possibilities
merit consideration.
"I' § 12(g) requires that every issuer with "... total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a
class of equity security (other than an exempted security) held of record by . . ." 500 or
more persons, must register his securities within four months after the fiscal year if such
securities are traded in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, or if the issuer is "in a
business affecting interstate commerce." Securities xchange Act of 1934, § 12(g)(1), 15
U.S.C.A. § 781(g)(1)(Supp. 1970). Since many local companies are in a "business affecting
interstate commerce," they would be subject to the 12(g) registration requirements as soon
as they had 500 shareholders of equity securities and $1,000,000 in gross assets. In point
of fact, the requirements were designed to include practically every publicly-held corporation.
1'2 See text and sources at notes 99-100, supra. Since most companies would normally
borrow on the security of the capital raised in any such offering, they could easily obtain
$1,000,000 in gross assets on an issue priced at considerably below that figure.
153 See notes 151-52, supra.
154 See text and sources accompanying notes 23 & 51, supra.
10, See text and sources accompanying notes 19, 27-33, supra.
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C. Purposes and Policies of 3(a)(11) and 4(2)
Assuming that the application of objective standards to 3(a) (11) would
be desirable, the remaining question to be pursued is whether the Com-
mission would be justified in doing so. Restated, is there enough similar-
ity in the purposes and policies underlying sections 3(a)(11) and 4(2)
to warrant SEC action in this area of the law? Although hardly free
from doubt, the contention in favor of the affirmative is not untenable, to
say the least. In order to adequately deal with this problem, some men-
tion must be made of legislative purpose.
With respect to 3(a) (11), legislative sources pretty clearly substantiate
what the Commission has often said, namely, that the exemption was de-
signed to cover ". . . only issues which in reality represent local financing
by local industries, carried out through local investment."''1 6 Probably
what Congress had in mind here was the typical ". . . offering by a small
businessman of a limited amount of securities to his friends, relatives, bus-
iness associates, and others."' 57 That is, the small, closely-held corpora-
tion, the local real estate investment trust, the divider of mineral interests
in nearby property, and the like, were to be spared from all of the ex-
pense and burdens of federal regulation. "Small local offerings of this
character [were] not a matter of Federal concern, [because they could be]
adequately supervised by State authority to the extent that regulation [was]
deemed necessary."'158 Parenthetically, the alleviation of administrative
chores that would otherwise descend upon the SEC was undoubtedly an-
other factor. Without 3(a) (11) the Commission, given its usual budget
and manpower levels, could not hope to carry out its statutory mandate
and yet still function effectively. The deluge of registration statements
would have simply overwhelmed it. This particular facet of 3(a)(11)
suggests a point which should be made explicit. The exemption was
not predicated on the absence of constitutional power, on the part of the
federal government, to reach wholly intrastate offerings. The antifraud
and civil liability provisions of the Act'59 dearly show this, i.e., that Con-
gress was aware of its authority to regulate in this area, provided that the
requisite jurisdictional nexus was established."'0 Rather 3(a)(11) was
enacted primarily for the sake of federalism. 6' By this exemption Con-
156 Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961); Sec. Act Release 1459 (1937); Meeker, supra note 65,
at 1868. See, H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); -LR. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1933); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); 78 CONG. REC. 10267 (1934)
(Remarks of Senators Dirksen & Rayburn). McCauley, supra note 10 at 939-41.
1571963 Special Study at 570-71.
158 Id.
159 Securities Act §§ 17 & 12(2), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77q & 771(2)(1963) respectively.
160 The "jurisdictional" means in the Securities Act is "use of any means or instruments
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails." Id. § 5, 12(2), 17.
161 See Securities Act § 18, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r (1963); McCauley, supra, note 10 at 939-
41; 1963 Special Study at 570; H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
[Vol. 31
COMMENTS
gress sought to maintain state interest and participation in the regulatory
business. Thus 3(a) (11) "... reflects a congressional policy, expressed
in various provisions of the Securities Act, not to preempt the field of
securities regulation or to supersede State control, but rather to fill the
gap in those areas where State regulation cannot adequately meet a na-
tional need."'1 2  A prime example of how this policy was supposed to
work is seen in the common situation where the issuer has incorporated in
one state, but has conducted his principal business in another. Since the
local securities agency of the state in which an issue could be floated would
presumably lack the authority to subpoena records, inspect operating sites,
interrogate officers, etc., it would be disabled from investigating the issuer
and verifying the information revealed in his registration forms. Thus it
would be unable to fulfill its regulatory function. 6  Here then, federal
regulation was to "fill the gap." On the other hand, where the issuer's
business was "genuinely local in character,"' federal intervention was
thought superfluous, if not unnecessary. In other words, the impact of
such small issues on national economic affairs was considered to be mini-
mal, or at least not substantial enough to call for federal regulation.
The purposes behind section 4(2) are not quite so dear; in fact, this
exemption appears to have been little more than a legislative after-
thought.'60 What sources there are though seem to indicate some similar-
ity of purpose. "Sales of stock . . . [were to] become subject to the act
unless the stockholders [were] so small in number that the sale to them
[would] not constitute a public offering."',6 In such a case, there was
"... no practical need for.., the application [of the act] or... the public
benefits [were) too remote.' 6 7  Statements such as these arguably suggest
a congressional purpose not unlike the type previously referred to, i.e.,
an ". . . offering by a small businessman . . . to his friends, relatives, busi-
ness associates, and others."' 68 In both 4(2) and 3(a)(11), Congress
probably intended to exempt only the incorporated partnership, or some-
thing slightly larger. More likely than not, Congress never expected that
either exemption would be used as extensively as they have been.' 69 In a
162 1963 Special Study at 570.
168 Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969).
164 Sec. Act Release 4434 (1961).
165 H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933) originally exempted "... transactions by an is-
suer not with or through an underwriter .... The phrase "... and not involving any public
offering" was appended in the House Committee, H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1933). The original phrase in H.R. 5480, supra, was then deleted as being superfluous in
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 203(a), 48 Stat. 906 (1934); see, H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934). Except for the statement quoted in text at note 166, infra, there was
no further reference to this exemption.
66 H.R. RE. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933).
16 7 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
168 1963 Special Study at 570-71.
169 See quotes and sources at notes 97-100, supra.
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manner of speaking, both appear to be different sides of the same coin-
exemption from federal regulation where the offering was too small to
affect the financial health of the nation's economic life. One was limited
in terms of geography, the other in terms of the number of offerees, and
presumably, their preferred position vis-a-vis the issuer. 017 Thus maybe
Congress perceived that some issuers would be unable to avail themselves
of 3(a) (11) but would be able to use 4(2), or Regulation A for that
matter. The converse of this, of course, is equally plausible. In both
cases then, Congress could have assumed that offerings like these could be
". .. adequately supervised by State authorities to the extent that regula-
tion [wasl deemed necessary."171  Since neither endangered the public
generally, neither was a "matter of Federal concern."
The analogy is by no means complete and there is no intention to imply
otherwise. Congress may also have foreseen the growth of institutional
investment and the varying uses to which 4(2) would eventually be put.
Maybe a dual function for 4(2) was intended. Whether it was or not is
unascertainable and perhaps moot. But the mere fact that 4(2) has come
to be used for the placement of large issues with a select number of insti-
tutional investors does not necessarily negate the earlier suggestion regard-
ing possible legislative intent. It does not, in and of itself, force the con-
trary conclusion, i.e., that the exemptions are so distinct in purpose and
function that comparable treatment is unwarranted. At best, the specific
legislative purposes which gave rise to 4(2) are obscure. This being so,
there would seem to be no compelling reason, as far as legislative policy is
concerned, to preclude the SEC from exercising its rule-making power along
the lines suggested above. After all, it was largely the Commission which
fashioned the current law. Therefore unless other, more practical rea-
sons can be found, the Commission would appear to have as much au-
thority for acting here as it would with respect to 4(2).72
There may, however, be "other, more practical" reasons. For one, al-
though Congress may not have anticipated the uses to which 4(2) would
be put, or the magnitude of the offerings made thereunder, certainly the
Commission cannot ignore this development. Whether it would make a
difference though is problematical. For example, 4(2) was construed in
Ralston Purina to require that offerees of a private placement be in such
a position vis-a-vis the issuer that they are ". . . able to fend for them-
170 See text and sources accompanying notes 173-75, infra.
1711963 Special Study at 571.
172 See Wheat Report at 153-56 for the Commission's position on its rule-making author-
ity in this area. It is understood, however, that some members of the staff have reserva-
tions about the desirability of effecting such a major change in existing law without explicit
legislative approval. This is in part due to the feeling that the 12(g) reporting require-
ments are not working as satisfactorily as was expected. Hence it is possible that the rules
may be delayed or even await legislative action.
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selves .... ,1*a3 If their relationship with the issuer is such that they are
unable to do this, then the issuer is prohibited from making a private of-
fering.17 4 Normally though, because they are so situated, they are presumed
to have access to the kind of information which would be revealed in a
registration statement, i.e., insider's knowledge. As a result, they do not
".. . need the protection of the Act."'1 5 No such presumption applies
to intrastate offerings, however. Further, 3(a) (11) was dearly enacted
to promote a legislative interest in federalism. No such policy is discern-
ible in 4(2). Besides, sometimes even the states exempt private offerings
to institutional investors' 7 6  Even so, these differences, standing alone,
ought not discourage application of the Wheat Report's objective tests to
3(a) (11). For the proposed rules are unabashedly designed to permit
the resale of unregistered securities to investors who, not being privy to in-
side information, are presumptively incapable of fending for themselves.
The law now being applied to 3(a)(11) likewise allows such resales
after the passage of indeterminate time. Consequently, the presumption
of the sophisticated investor is not particularly relevant, nor necessarily
fatal to the proposal made herein. Again, the new system is dependent
not so much upon the actual knowledge of the investing public, but upon
the information which the issuer publicly discloses. If the issuer is a
reporting company, then the information should be available to the public
by the time that trading begins; if not, interstate trading will be delayed.
And in either case, the states' role in the regulatory process will be unaf-
fected. Thus the presumption of the sophisticated investor and the con-
gressional interest in federalism ought not deter the Commission from
acting in this area.17 1
173 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953).
174 Op. Gen. Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935), 17 C.F.R. § 231.o
285 (1970); Sec. Act Release 4552 (1962); Orrick, Non-Public Offerings of Corporate
Securities-Limitations on the Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act, 21 U. PiTT. L
RLV. 1, 10-11(1959); Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L.
REV. 851, 859-60 (1959); Wheat Report at 160-77; & authorities cited note 31, supra.
175 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119,127 (1953).
176 E.g., Ohio Revised Code Ann. § 1707.03(D) (Page 1964).
177 Possibly one factor, as yet unmentioned, could change the equation-the quality of
the securities offered under the different exemptions. The securities ordinarily associated
with institutional investment-bonds and preferred stock-are generally thought to offer
a more secure investment than those associated with 3(a)(11). Thus the probability of ex-
posing the investing public to high-risk issues might be reduced if only unregistered 4(2)
securities are traded. On the other hand, 3(a)(11) offerings would be regulated by state
supervisory agencies whereas frequently 4(2) offerings are not. And trading would occur in
neither case unless the issuer was a reporting company. Moreover, the association of quality
securities with 4(2) offerings is probably somewhat out-dated. In recent times, the pres-
sures to invest in equity or convertible debt securities have been marked enough to under-
cut the premises upon which this assumption was based. Whether it should be controlling or
not is debatable. It should suffice to say, however, that if 3(a)(11) securities are too dis-
similar to justify comparable treatment, the reasons therefore are not readily apparent.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this article was to assess the potential impact
of the Wheat Report proposals on the use of the intrastate exemption.
Having done this, it should have become apparent that the objective stand-
ards which eventually will be applied to resale transactions in 4(2) securi-
ties could be applied to similar transactions in 3(a) (11) securities. And
although the specific standards which were designed for trading in 4(2)
securities may be unsuitable for the peculiarities of 3(a)(11), the cer-
tainty and clarity with which the rules are defined should definitely be
the same.
... the Study believes that the proposed rules are necessary not only to
provide greater predictability, but to give fuller effect to the statutory pur-
pose. . . . (The) most casual inquiry into the effects of [the] prevail-
ing interpretative pattern discloses its grave short-comings in this respect.
Sale without registration may turn on events wholly unconnected with
the needs of investors, and without distinction as to whether (1) the issuer
of the securities is providing information concerning its business and fi-
nancial affairs in regular reports to the Commission, (2) the quantity of
securities being sold without registration is massive or modest, and
[whether] (3) there is, or is not, a heavily compensated selling effort
-involved. The proposed rules have been designed to do away with such
anomalies. 178
Kenneth Al. Royalty
178 Wheat Report at 155-56.
[Vol. 31
